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THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
COMPUTER SOFTWARE CONTRACTS: A
SQUARE PEG WON'T FIT IN A ROUND HOLE
The explosive growth of the computer industry has outdistanced efforts
to adapt legal theories to govern computer-related disputes. Computer
software, a detailed set of instructions which tells computer hardware
what to do, ' is an intangible collection of ideas, even though it must be
kept and transferred on a tangible medium. 2 Traditional sales law was
developed to deal with tangible goods, not intangibles. Consequently, it
is particularly difficult to adjudicate software disputes using traditional
3
sales law theories.
Courts have consistently held that Article 2 of the Uniform Commer4
cial Code (U.C.C.) governs transactions involving computer hardware.
5
Treatment of computer software transactions has been less consistent.
This Comment contends that computer software, an intangible, is not
within the scope of Article 2. It further contends that the warranty of mer1. The terms "software" and "hardware" represent, respectively, the intangible and tangible
portions of a computer. The player piano provides a simple analogy to the software/hardware distinction. Both a player piano and computer hardware are tangible. A player piano can play many kinds of
music: classical, ragtime, pop. Similarly, computer hardware can run many kinds of programs: income tax calculations, space-shot trajectories, word processing. Which roll of music is used determines what type of music the player piano will play. Similarly, which computer software is used
determines what type of function the computer hardware will perform.
2. Just as a musical composition to be played on a player piano must be kept and transferred on a
music roll, software must be kept and transferred on a physical memory medium: as minute electromagnetic fields on magnetic tapes or disks, as punches on paper cards, or even as written words in a
manual or book. But software itself, like the musical composition, is intangible, and should not be
confused with the tangible memory medium incidentally necessary to store the ideas.
3. Software presents novel questions in many areas of the law. Is software copyrightable? See
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (yes). Is software
subject to the same taxes as hardware? See Comment, Software Taxation:A CriticalReevaluation of
the Notion ofIntangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 859 (jurisdictions vary). Is software patentable? See
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (a process including software was held patentable).
The need to apply traditional legal theories to software controversies gives courts and commentators an ideal opportunity to reexamine the theoretical underpinnings of traditional legal theories. This
can and should lead to the clarification of fundamental concepts that have become muddled over the
years.
4. Most courts apply U.C.C. Article 2 provisions to software-hardware transactions-transactions where both software and hardware are sold-without discussing whether software is a good.
See, e.g., APLications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 672
F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974); Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc.,
305 So. 2d 215 (Fla. App. 1974).
In one case, however, both parties agreed that Article 2 did not apply to the software-hardware
lease at issue. Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504, 505 n. 1 (D.
Conn. 1975).
5. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
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chantability cannot meaningfully be applied by analogy in computer software contracts. Finally, this Comment concludes that existing tort and
contract causes of action provide software users with sufficient protection.
I.

APPLYING TRADITIONAL SALES LAW TO SOFTWARE
TRANSACTIONS

Courts faced with disputes involving software transactions have consis6
tently applied Article 2 provisions, using predominant factor analysis,
7
without adequately considering whether it is appropriate to do so. Since
hardware-indisputably a "good" 8-is considered the 'predominant factor' in a hybrid software-hardware transaction, courts have treated such
transactions as sales of goods 9 and applied Article 2 provisions without
reaching the question of whether software is also a good.
6. In hybrid transactions involving both goods and nongoods, most courts have applied predominant factor analysis, finding Article 2 applicable if the goods aspect of the transaction predominates.
See. e.g.. Wells v. I0-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1979); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951,
960 (8th Cir. 1974) (Article 2 covers contracts where "their predominant factor, their thrust, their
purpose" is a transaction in goods). See also R. DUESEN13ERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERSUNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.0311], at 1-22, -23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
DU ESENBERG].
Other courts, however, reject predominant factor analysis. Instead, they apply provisions of Article 2 to the portion of the transaction which involves goods, even though services or other nongoods
predominate. See Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222, 226 (10th Cir. 1967) (Article 2
provisions applied to the part of the contract involving goods, even though the value of the goods
constituted only five to ten percent of the contract price); R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF
SALES § 21, at 47 (1970).
7. Only two courts have directly addressed the issue of whether software is a good. Triangle
Underwriters v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). modified, 604 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1979), discussed infra at notes 12-14 and accompanying text; Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp.. No. 78-3077-F (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1981) (order ruling on summary judgment and
other motions) (available on LEXIS). discussed infra at notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
No court has refused to apply Article 2 provisions to a hybrid software-hardware transaction. However, a court can use any of three different lines of analysis to apply Article 2 provisions: (1) consider
software a "good" and apply Article 2 provisions directly, see Triangle. 457 F. Supp. at 769; (2)
consider computer hardware to be the "predominant factor" in a hybrid software-hardware transaction and apply Article 2 provisions to the entire contract, see Triangle, 604 F.2d at 742-43; or (3)
apply Article 2 provisions by analogy, see Samuel Black Co.
8. Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies only to "transactions in goods." U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
Hardware is clearly a good under the Article 2 definition. Indeed, the software/hardware distinction
itself is a distinction between the tangible, movable machine (a good) and the intangible software (not
a good). See supra note 1;Comment, Liabilityfor Defects in ComputerSoftware, 53 1. URB. L. 279,
280 (1975).
9. See. e.g.. Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1979). In
general. hybrid software-hardware contracts have been considered contracts for the sale of goods,
with the software considered a hardware component. See D. BRANDON & S. SEGELSTEIN, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS 76 (1976).
The practice of "bundling" software and programming services with hardware has perpetuated the

Merchantability and Software
Recent developments in the software industry have made this traditional analysis obsolete. In modem software-hardware hybrid transactions, software represents a larger share of the transaction than previously. Moreover, software houses-businesses that produce and sell only
software-now compete with software-hardware producers in the expanding software market.1 0 With these changes in the industry, transactions in which software is the predominant or sole factor have become

commonplace.
Development of legal theories to protect software users has not kept
pace with the changes in the software industry. The crucial questionwhether Article 2 provisions apply to software transactions-has not been
authoritatively answered, and in fact has rarely been addressed. "1In Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, Inc., 12 the district court held that custom-designed software is a "good.' 1 3 The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that Article 2 applied to the transaction, but applied predominant factor analysis in doing so. 14 Because the circuit court
found that hardware, a good, predominated, it did not reach the question
of whether software is itself a good.
In contrast, the court in Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp.15 expressed reservations about whether Article 2 applies to hybrid softwarenotion that hardware is the predominant factor in a hybrid software-hardware transaction. A "bundled" transaction is a special type of hybrid transaction. A buyer in a bundled transaction pays the
same price for hardware whether he wants software or programming services or not. Thus, hardware
is clearly the "predominant factor" in a bundled transaction. See Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5
(software bundled with hardware is treated as part of the hardware for purposes of the Investment Tax
Credit and depreciation deductions).
However, bundled transactions have become unpopular because courts usually consider them to be
unlawful tying arrangements. Major software-hardware producers no longer enter into bundled transactions. See, e.g., IBM v. Catamore Enters., 548 F.2d 1065, 1069 (Ist Cir. 1976) (IBM "unbundied" in June 1969), cert. denied,431 U.S. 960 (1977); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,
361 F. Supp. 325, 328 n.l, 334 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (Burroughs Corp. no longer enters into
bundled transactions), affd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974). The demise of the bundled transaction is another trend in the software industry that has increased the importance of careful examination
and proper treatment of software sales contracts.
10. See K. FISHMAN, THE COMPUrER ESTABLISHMENT 276-77 (1981).
I1. See supranote 7.
12. 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
13. The court stated:
Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed software remained Honeywell's
intellectual property, Triangle was purchasing the product of those concepts. That product required efforts to produce, but it was a product nevertheless and, though intangible, is more
readily characterized as "goods" than "services." Intangibles may be "goods" within the
meaning of U.C.C. § 2-106.
Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified, 604
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
14. Triangle, 604 F.2d at 742-43.
15. Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1981) (order
ruling on summary judgment and other motions) (available on LEXIS).
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hardware transactions. The court did not resolve the issue, however, because it was willing to apply Article 2 provisions by analogy even if the
transaction was not within the express scope of Article 2.16
Both the Triangle and Samuel Black Co. courts also considered tort
causes of action.1 7 These courts and others, however, applied Article 2
provisions to computer transactions rather than such tort theories as negligence, malpractice, and misrepresentation. Even if courts were willing to
accept these tort theories, the unavailability of damages for economic injury under the most common tort theories-negligence and products liability-makes them unsatisfactory for most software users. 1 8
II.

U.C.C. SECTION 2-314 SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO
SOFTWARE TRANSACTIONS

The question of whether Article 2 provisions govern contracts for computer software arises most often when the plaintiff seeks the protection of
the Article 2 implied warranty of merchantability, contained in U.C.C.
section 2-314.19 There are two methods a court may use to apply the warranty of merchantability to allow recovery of economic losses caused by
defective software. First, if the literal terms of section 2-314 include software transactions within their scope, the warranty may be applied directly. Second, even if Article 2 does not expressly cover software contracts, the warranty may be implied by analogy. Both of these methods of
Article 2 application are improper in computer software transactions.
A.

Software TransactionsAre Not Within the LiteralScope of U.C.C.
Section 2-314

A warranty of merchantability should not be implied directly in software transactions for two reasons. First, computer software should not be
considered "goods" under Article 2 because software is an intangible.
16. The court justified its failure to resolve the issue by stating that "'the
U.C.C.'s provisions are
both helpful and persuasive by analogy" and applying them would not "alter the result in this particular case." Id.
17. See Triangle. 457 F. Supp. at 769-71 (discussing malpractice and fraud claims); Triangle.
604 F.2d at 743-48 (same); Samuel Black Co. (discussing tortious misrepresentation claim).
18. Tort theories generally are not available for economic loss. See infra note 75. However. the
tort action of professional malpractice has been successfully used to recover such damages. See infra
note 65. Although the professional malpractice cause of action is well suited for application to software disputes, see infra Part IIIAI. courts have declined to apply it,
see infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
19. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978) provides, in part, that: "Unless excluded or modified (Section 2316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."

Merchantability and Software
Even though the U.C.C. should be broadly interpreted to promote its
underlying policies, 20 the term "goods" should not be stretched to cover
intangibles, such as software, that fundamentally differ from traditional
goods. Second, most software transactions do not involve a "sale" of the
software, which is a prerequisite to coverage under U.C.C. section 2314.
1. Software Is Not a Good
Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies only to "transactions in goods." '2 1
"Goods" are defined as "all things ...which are movable. " 22 Although
Article 2's coverage is not expressly limited to tangibles, the provisions
of Article 2 are tailored to govern "items of tangible property ...which
23
normally flow in commerce."
Software is an intangible. 24 Intangibles are fundamentally different
from traditional goods. 25 Consequently, although one court has held to
20. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1978). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOKOFTHE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4, at 14-18 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
As noted in the official comments, the U.C.C. was broadly drafted and designed to be liberally
construed so that it could be adapted to conform to new areas and practices. See U.C.C. § 1-102
official comment 1 (1978). But the scope of application of the U.C.C. should not be perfunctorily
expanded. Rather, the U.C.C.'s "interpretation and application [should] be limited to its reason."
Id.
21. U.C.C. §2-102(1978).
22. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978). This movability requirement removes real property from Article 2
coverage. 1G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS INPERSONAL PROPERTY § 12.2, at 369-70 (1965).
Services have also traditionally been excluded from Article 2 coverage. See, e.g., Gerber v. Weinstein, 6 N.J. Misc. 284, 141 A. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (held that a contract for architect's plans was for
services, and thus the Uniform Sales Act, which applies only to contracts for goods, was inapplicable); Blottner, Derrico, Weiss & Hoffman, P.C. v. Fier, 101 Misc. 2d 371, 420 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Civ.
Ct. 1979) (provisions of Article 2 held inapplicable to contract for rendition of legal services); cases
collected in Comment, Contractsfor Services DistinguishedFromThose to Sell Goods, 15 FORDHAM
L. REV. 92 (1946) (pre-U.C.C. cases).
Courts and commentators have not been clear, however, as to why services are not goods. See R.
NORDSTROM. supra note 6, § 22, at 42-43. The traditional distinction between services and goods
does seem to support this Comment's argument that items for which the concept of movability has no
meaning are not goods under Article 2. See infra text accompanying note 29.
23. R. NORDSTROM. supranote 6, § 22, at 46.
24. See Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
modified, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Comment, supra note 8, at 280; supra notes 1-2. But see
Note, ComputerProgramsas Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MICH. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (1979) (distinguishes a computer program copy (a tangible) from the computer program itself (an intangible)).
25. For example, traditional goods, which are tangible personal property, can be neatly handled
using traditional property law. But software and other intangibles cannot be handled so neatly. Indeed, many fundamental property concepts are almost meaningless when applied to software.
Software cannot be neatly handled under traditional property law because property law is fundamentally based on the concept of possession. The maxim "possession is nine-tenths of the law"
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the contrary, 26 "goods" should not be construed to include intangibles.
The term "movable" is the only express limitation in the definition of
goods under Article 2.27 "Movability" is designed to distinguish be-

illustrates just how fundamental the concept of possession is to property law. But the concept of
possession is almost nonsensical when applied to software.
A simple example illustrates the point. If A sells a tangible piece of property to B, A must dispossess herself of the property. But if software is sold instead of property, the situation changes. Software can be reproduced at virtually no cost. Consequently, A does not need to dispossess herself of
the property in order to sell it to B. The same software can be possessed by A and B at the same time.
See letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in part in Prager. A
History ofIntellectual Propertyfrom 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 711, 759 (1944) ("(Nio
one possesses [an idea] the less because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an
idea from me receives instruction himself without lessening mine, as he who lights his taper at mine
receives light without darkening mine."). Such a situation is impossible with tangible personal property. Ideas, therefore, are conceptually different from property. See id.
Clearly, the concept of possession as applied to traditional personal property cannot be applied to
software. Because the concept of possession is fundamental in property law, it is a necessary concept
for such concepts as title and ownership to make sense. Therefore, such concepts are almost meaningless when applied to software. See M. WESSEL, FREEDOM'S EDGE: THE COMPUTER THREATTO SOCI-

ETY 123 (1974). That concepts such as title also underlie sales law indicates that traditional sales law
concepts are probably also inapplicable to software. Consequently, software should not be considered
to be goods under the U.C.C.
26. Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified.
604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). The Triangle court stated that "[i]ntangibles may be 'goods' under
Article 2 of the U.C.C." 457 F. Supp. at 769. The Triangle court supported this assertion by citing
Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assocs., 37 A.D.2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1971).
The Silverman court did indeed hold that the sale of cooperative apartment stock and proprietary
lease was a "transaction in goods" under Article 2 of the U.C.C. However, the Silverman court
characterized the issue to be whether the sale was one of realty or personalty. 323 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
The court did not address the issue of whether the property was tangible or intangible. Since there is
no indication that the Silverman court considered the stock and lease to be intangible, the Silverman
decision does not support the Triangle court's assertion that intangibles can be goods.
27. "Goods" are defined as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale." U.C.C. § 2-105(l) (1978).
"Things," the other key term used in the definition, has no particular legal meaning. It is an allencompassing term which is not narrowed in its U.C.C. usage. Given the ambiguity of the common
definition of "things" and the fact that no attempt is made in Article 2 to define the term, it seems
doubtful that use of the term alone is designed to include or exclude intangibles. But see Note, supra
note 24, at 1151 n.l I (apparently interpreting the term "things" to exclude intangibles from the
definition of "goods": "'The intangible instructions are not a thing and therefore not a good under the
U.C.C."). This doubt is reinforced by the fact that the term "things" is also used in the Article 9
definition of goods, and there the drafters felt the need to explicitly exclude general intangibles from
the definition. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
"Specially manufactured goods" are expressly included in the Article 2 definition of goods.
U.C.C. § 2-105(l) (1978). However, even though other provisions of Article 2 may apply to specially manufactured goods, the warranty of merchantability will typically be inapplicable to such
goods. In most cases, there is no standard of merchantability to apply to unique, custom-made goods.
See Art Press, Ltd. v. Western Printing Mach. Co., No. 82-C-01 16 (N.D. III. Nov. 18, 1983) (order
ruling on summary judgment motion) (available on LEXIS) ("custom-made goods generally have no
ordinary purpose"; therefore, the warranty of merchantability is not implied in their sale). See also
infra note 54.

Merchantability and Software
tween real property and personal property. 28 But other items, such as intangibles and services, are impossible to characterize as movable or immovable.
Movability is a physical, spatial quality. Consequently, it only makes
sense in reference to tangibles, which have physical qualities. Intangibles
do not have physical characteristics. They are neither movable nor immovable: movability simply has no meaning in the context of intangibles .29 It is doubtful that use of the term "movable" was meant to include
intangibles for which the term has no meaning.
The fact that a tangible, movable "good" is involved in most contracts
involving intangibles does not mean that the intangibles themselves are
movable goods. 30 For example, when a lawyer fulfills a contract to draw
up a will, tangible property (the paper on which the will is written) passes
to the buyer. However, the tangible property that passes to the buyer is a
minor part of the transaction. The real subject matter of the contract is the
thought process of the lawyer. Because the real subject matter of the contract is not a traditional "good," Article 2 provisions are inappropriate
31
and should not be used to govern the contract.
The express distinction between "general intangibles" and "goods"
made in Article 9 of the U.C.C. supports the argument that the Article 2
28. See supranote 22.
29. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 6, § 22, at 46 ("[t]he drafters were concerned with items of
tangible property"); Comment, supranote 3, at 868 & n.53; Note, supra note 24, at 1150 n.1 1.
In Article 9 cases, courts have uniformly distinguished intangible ideas from goods. See, e.g.,
United States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.H. 1966) (technical drawings
and reports are "in reality the visual reproductions on paper of engineering concepts, ideas and principles" and thus are more correctly classified as intangibles than goods). See infra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
30. But see Holmes, Application of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer
System Acquisitions, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 25 (1982). Holmes argues that:
Article Two should always apply to the sale of programs and to the programming services that
culminate in a moveable end product. There is no difference between rendering professional
photography or printing services that culminate in a portrait or a pamphlet as an Article Two
good and making the same judgment about services that result in a moveable disc or tape.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But Holmes' view of movability is overinclusive. It would include most legal
services (including particularly the drafting of documents), most architectural services, and all repair
services, since all these services culminate in a movable end product. Neither the case law nor Article
2 itself indicates that the distinction between goods and services has been abrogated. Consequently,
Holmes' extreme view, which assumes just that, is incorrect.
31. Although no court has addressed the question of whether a will is a good, courts have held
that architectural blueprints are not goods. See Gerber v. Weinstein, 6 N.J. Misc. 284, 141 A. 3
(Sup. Ct. 1928) (an architect's contract for drawing sketches for an apartment house was not a contract for the sale of goods and thus was not governed by the Uniform Sales Act). See also Raffel v.
Perley, 14 Mass. App. 242, 437 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (1982) (surveyor's plan is not a good under
Article 2).
In Article 9 cases, courts are equally reluctant to classify architectural and engineering designs as
"goods." See infra note 34.
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definition of "goods" does not include intangibles. Article 9 defines
"goods" as "things which are movable.' 32 This is virtually the same as
the Article 2 definition. 33 "General intangibles" are explicitly excluded
from the definition of "goods" in Article 9.34 The omission of a corresponding express exclusion from the Article 2 definition was simply an
oversight. 35 Thus, the general intangibles that are expressly excluded
from Article 9 definition of goods should also be excluded from the Article 2 definition.
2.

Computer Software TransactionsAre Not Sales

The scope of section 2-314 is limited to the "sale" of goods, 36 rather
than the broader "transactions in goods," which is the general scope of
Article 2. 37 A "sale" is defined as "the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price." 38 Software contracts rarely involve the passage of
title to software. Instead, the "purchaser" usually gets a license to use
the software. 39 This license typically is a nonexclusive right to make a
limited number of copies of a program for internal use. The "purchaser"
has no right to make copies of the program to sell or give to others, although ordinarily he can sell or give away the copy he purchased. 40 The
32. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h)(1978).
33. See supra note 27.
34. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h) (1978). "General intangibles" include personal property -'other than
goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and money." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1978). Case
law has interpreted the term "general intangibles" to include such items as technical blueprints and
drawings. See, e.g., United States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.H. 1966).
Therefore, items such as technical blueprints and drawings are not Article 9 goods. Just as technical
blueprints and drawings are intangibles rather than goods, so too is software. See IBM v. Catamore
Enters., 548 F.2d 1065, 1068 & nn.4-5 (lst Cir. 1976) (analogizing software to architectural blueprints), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977).
35. Grant Gilmore, a principal drafter of Article 9, stated that there is no good reason why the
Article 2 and Article 9 definitions of goods are not identical; it was just a loose end that never got
tidied up. G. GILMORE, supra note 22, § 12.2, at 368. He also noted that both definitions exclude
intangibles, and that the exclusions amount to the same thing in both definitions. Id. at 370.
36. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978) ("a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale" (emphasis added)).
37. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
38. Id. § 2-106().
39. R. BIGELOW & S. NYCUM, YOUR COMPUTER AND THE LAW 117 (1975); R. BERNACCHI & G.
LARSEN. DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS AND THE LAW 368-69 (1974) (license of software most common: outright sale uncommon); D. BRANDON & S. SEGELSTEIN, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS
109-10 (1976) (the fact that the user does not buy title or ownership makes applicability of Article 2
questionable): J. AVER & C. HARRIS, COMPUTER CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS 290-91 (1981) (programs
are usually licensed rather than sold, so the vendor retains control). See also IBM Corp., License
Agreement for IBM Program Products, reprinted in R. FREED, COMPUTERS AND LAW 175 (5th ed.
1976).
40. The Radio Shack software license agreement is typical:
A. Radio Shack grants to CUSTOMER a non-exclusive, paid up license to use on CUS-
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purchaser thus does not receive all rights (i.e., title) to the software.
41
Therefore, no "sale" occurs.
Courts have not hesitated to ignore the fact that a transaction is a lease
or bailment in applying U.C.C. warranties if the transaction is analogous
to a sale. 42 However, courts should not treat transactions as sales when
they fundamentally differ from sales. 43 Because all rights do not pass to
TOMER'S computer the Radio Shack computer software received. Title to the media on which
the software is recorded (cassette and/or disk) or stored (ROM) is transferred to the CUSTOMER, but not title to the software.
B. In consideration for this license, CUSTOMER shall not reproduce copies of Radio Shack
software except to reproduce the number of copies required for use on CUSTOMER'S computer
(if the software allows a backup copy to be made), and shall include Radio Shack's copyright
notice on all copies of software reproduced in whole or in part.
C. CUSTOMER may resell Radio Shack's system and applications software (modified or not,
in whole or in part), provided CUSTOMER has purchased one copy of the software for each one
resold. The provisions of this software License (paragraphs A, B, and C) shall also be applicable
to third parties purchasing such software from CUSTOMER.
41. Passage of title is necessary to effect a sale under Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978). Once
title has passed to the buyer, the seller has little or no control over its destiny or the conditions of its
resale. Thus an Article 2 sale leaves the seller no control over its product.
A computer software seller must maintain tight control over his program to preserve its commercial
value. Because copyright and patent protection is limited and uncertain, almost all software sellers
use some form of a limited-use agreement, usually a license, to market their software. See R. BERNACCHI & G. LARSEN, supranote 39, at 368-69. Otherwise, unauthorized copies of the software tend
to proliferate and the seller finds that he has lost his basic market. See id.; W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND
Ar'rrrRusT LAW 24 (1973) (information, because it can be reproduced at no cost, cannot be marketed
in the same way as goods). Thus, sales are impractical and uncommon in computer software contracts.
42. Sales are often disguised as leases to get favorable tax treatment or to retain a security interest
in the item without complying with Article 9 requirements. Or a transaction may be financed as a
lease rather than a sale, even though the lessee has all indicia of ownership. In such cases, courts and
parties have usually ignored the fact that the "sale" is technically a lease and have applied Article 2
as though it were a sale. See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 778 n. 1
(E.D. Wis. 1982); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59
Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 (Civ. Ct. 1969) ("commercial transactions which tend to the
identical economic result" as sales should be treated as sales), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d
910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Term 1970); see also DUESENBERG, supranote 6, § 1.03[4], at 1-36 to
-42; Earmon Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1295-98 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. Unfortunately, many courts are unwilling to distinguish between a sale and a nonsale transaction whether or not the nonsale transaction is analogous to a sale. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Seattle,
79 Wn. 2d 198, 201, 484 P.2d 405, 407 (1971). There does seem to be indirect support for such a
position. See U.C.C. § 2-313 official comment 2 (1978) ("the warranty sections of this Article are
not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined . . . to sales contracts . . . [but] may arise in other appropriate circum-

stances"). However, this language merely states that courts should not feel that Article 2 robs them
of the power to extend warranties where appropriate; it does not by itself support such an extension.
Indeed, the fact that Article 2 expressly limits warranties to sales is evidence that the warranties are
not appropriate in every transaction.
Because Article 2 expressly limits the scope of its warranties to sales, they should be applied in
nonsales transactions only by analogy. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 9-6, at 346 & n.73,
349; R. NORDSTROM, supranote 6, § 21, at 42-44. See also Murray, Under the SpreadingAnalogy of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 447, 449-54 (1971). But see R.
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the "buyer" in a typical software license, the difference between it and a
sale is not just semantic.
The commercial context of sales differs significantly from that of licenses. Licenses restrict and impede the flow of goods in commerce.
Sales, on the other hand, allow goods to flow freely and unimpeded in
commerce. Indeed, almost all software producers choose to license their
software rather than sell it precisely because they want to restrain competition. Licensing their software rather than selling it gives them great
power to control distribution of their software, greater than that provided
by copyright protection alone. Software producers can and do use this
power to prevent or delay the sale of comparable software by a different
producer. Thus, lack of competition distinguishes a license-only market
from a sales and license market.
Free competition between producers of comparable goods is a prerequisite to the development of a merchantability standard. Prospective purchasers of traditional goods weigh quality against cost in choosing between comparable, competing goods. From this normal operation of the
marketplace, a quality standard, as well as a fair price standard, emerges.
But the unimpeded availability of comparable units is necessary for the
forces of supply and demand to yield a minimum quality standard. Sales
generally provide this unimpeded availability; licenses generally do not.
Thus, a standard of merchantability will not develop in a license-only
marketplace. The fact that sales are commercially infeasible in the software industry 44 clearly indicates that comparable software will not flow
freely in commerce. Consequently, the standard of merchantability can45
not develop in the software marketplace.

BERNACCHI & S. LARSEN, supra note 39, at 138-39. Further, application by analogy is appropriate
only after carefully weighing the policies involved. See U.C.C. § 2-105 official comment 1 (1978)
(express exclusion of investment securities from Article 2 coverage should not "prevent the application of a particular section of this Article by analogy to securities... when the reason of that section
nakes such application sensible" (emphasis added)). The express limitation of the warranties to sales
should not be lightly dismissed as verbiage by courts overly zealous to protect consumers at the
expense of twisting a carefully devised and clearly expressed statutory scheme. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 12-12, at 485 (questioning the wisdom of disregarding the literal meaning of
the U.C.C.).
44. See supra note 41.
45. In almost all cases, the standard of merchantability can develop where sales of goods occur.
Thus, the warranty of merchantability is expressly implied in sales contracts. In some instances, the
standard may develop where the transaction is not a sale or where the items sold are not goods. The
software industry, however, is not one of those instances. See infra Part 1111.
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B.

The Warranty ofMerchantabilityShould Not Be Applied by Analogy
to Software Transactions

The drafters of the U.C.C. expressly limited its overall scope, and
many provisions contain further limitations. Certainly the drafters did not
include these express limitations only to have them completely read out of
the U.C.C. by the courts. Some U.C.C. provisions, however, can be usefully applied even in circumstances not falling within their expressly defined scope. In such cases, the U.C.C. provides a uniform, consistent,
and well-reasoned source of contract law, and appropriate provisions
should be applied by analogy. 46
Courts must be careful to examine the underlying policy and purpose of
a U.C.C. provision before applying it by analogy. Courts should not apply a U.C.C. provision by analogy unless they can do so usefully. The
warranty of merchantability cannot usefully be applied by analogy to
computer software transactions for two reasons. First, the standard of
"merchantability" cannot be determined for most, if not all, computer
software. Second, the software industry must be encouraged to develop
rather than burdened with an unreasonably high quality standard which,
in practice, its products cannot meet.
1.

The StandardofMerchantabilityCannotMeaningfully Be Applied to
Software

The underlying concept of merchantability is that "merchantable
goods must . . . be 'honestly' resalable in the normal course of business
because they are what they purport to be.' 47 Of the minimum requirements of merchantability, 48 only two apply to computer software. To be
46. See generally Murray, supranote 43.
Three factors encourage courts to apply Article 2 by analogy. First, Article 2 serves as a "relatively simple, quickly available source of law." Id. at 480. Second, Article 2 and contract common
law are interwoven: they share many of the same concepts. Consequently, many U.C.C. principles
will be applied to contracts common law by the same experts who developed them for the U.C.C. Id.
Third, Article 2 can lend an "aura of authority" to judicial innovation. Id.
47. U.C.C. § 2-314 official comment 8 (1978), which discusses how merchantability warranty
protection extends to middlemen.
48. Section 2-314(2) (1978) of the U.C.C. sets forth minimum requirements for merchantability:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c)are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e)are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
For an excellent history of the development of the warranty of merchantability, including the origin
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merchantable, goods must, inter alia, "pass without objection in the
trade under the contract description," 49 and be "fit for the ordinary pur50
poses for which such goods are used."
These measures of merchantability are not useful when applied to software because they can be determined only by comparing the quality of
similar goods. Computer programs are so diverse that generic names that
can be used in the "contract description" have not appeared. The generic
name "word processor," for instance, does not connote a certain quality
of "goods," as does a generic name such as "top grade cotton" or
"number one potatoes." The "contract description" of computer software does not normally tell the user what identifiable characteristics or
minimum functions the program can be expected to meet. 5 1 Instead, a
user can demand that a program do only what it is represented as being
able to do, and those representations are express warranties rather than
the minimum quality requirements of the warranty of merchantability.
Similarly, the "ordinary purposes for which such goods are used" cannot be determined for most computer programs. A word-processing program, for example, clearly has a different purpose than a NASA program
used to calculate space-shot trajectories. Thus, no ordinary purpose exists
for a broad category such as "software." But to draw any narrower classifications in a meaningful way is impossible. In order to define the ordinary purposes for which goods are used, similar goods must be grouped
together. In order to make a group of "similar" programs, the programs
must be compared, and those with similar characteristics put in the same
group.
However, qualitative comparison between different computer proof these requirements, see Llewellyn, On Warrant, of Qualit,, and Society (pts. I & 2). 36 COLUM.
L. REv. 699 (1936), 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341 (1937) (Karl Llewellyn was principal draftsman of
U.C.C. Article 2).
49. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (1978).
50. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).

51. As competition in the software industry intensifies, instances may arise where producers of
similar programs directly compete with one another and offer the buyer software that is so similar that
comparison of the software may be made. If this occurs, contract descriptions may develop that can
serve as bases for a standard of merchantability. One such instance may be word-processing programs, which may become sufficiently standardized to give rise to a minimum standard of quality

applicable to all such programs. Currently, however, the contract description "word processor" does
not connote any minimum function or identifiable characteristic that could form the basis for a merchantability standard.

In the majority of cases, meaningful comparisons cannot be made even between two programs in
the same product market. Comparing the quality of two video games, for example, is virtually impossible. Is Pac-Man of better quality than Donkey Kong? There simply are no identifiable characteris-

tics or minimum functions that can be used as a basis for comparing two such video games. Consequently, the contract description "'video game" carries with it no particular connotations of quality
and cannot be used as a merchantability standard.
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grams is difficult. Different computer programs are essentially different
ideas, and ideas cover such a broad spectrum that it is virtually impossible
to compare them. 52 In that respect, software is much like services. Qualitative comparison cannot be made for services as it is for goods, since the
"product" of a service is usually unique and not resalable. 53 Consequently, no equivalence exists among performed services which one may
use to determine whether a performed service is average in the trade or
whether it can be used for the ordinary purposes for which similar services are used.
In short, because quality comparisons of software cannot be made, the
warranty of merchantability cannot meaningfully be implied in computer
software contracts. The standard of merchantability would have to be determined by comparing similar programs in order to determine identifying
characteristics and minimum functions of that type of program. This cannot be done. 54 Consequently, no minimum quality standard will emerge,
and courts will have to apply an indeterminable standard.
52. Although a book merchant impliedly warrants the tangible, physical properties (such as
printing and binding) of the books it sells, the thoughts and ideas conveyed by the book are not
warranted. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a recipe
calling for poisonous mushrooms was not impliedly warranted to be merchantable), cert. denied, 353
So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977). The Cardozo court noted that "ideas... are not equivalent to commercial
products." Id. See also Haralampopoulos v. Capital News Agency, Inc., 70 Il. App. 2d 17, 217
N.E.2d 366 (1966) (court rejected magazine retailer's claim that magazines sold to him, which were
legally obscene and thus not fit for resale, were unmerchantable).
Just as a bookseller warrants the quality of the binding of the book but not the quality of the ideas in
the book, a distributor of computer programs impliedly warrants the tangible, physical properties of
the movable item in the transaction (usually the storage medium, see supra note 2), but not the
thoughts and ideas sold. The separation of transactions into goods and nongoods portions, and the
application of Article 2 concepts only to the goods portion of the transaction, is not a novel idea. See
supra note 6.
Hybrid software-hardware transactions should also be divided into goods and nongoods portions.
Even though most software-hardware producers no longer "bundle" software into hardware transactions, see supra note 9, hybrid software-hardware transactions are not uncommon. In hybrid transactions courts should divide the transaction into goods and nongoods portions. The warranty of merchantability should be applied to the goods portion (see supra note 6; Holmes, supra note 30, at
18-23), and professional negligence theory should be applied to the nongoods portion (see infra Part
IIIA 1). In some instances, the hardware may consist of unique goods, however, and the warranty of
merchantability should not be applied to any part of the transaction. See infra note 54.
53. For example, each patient who receives a heart transplant receives a unique, incomparable
"product," since each patient receives a transplant tailored to his unique medical needs. Additionally, the recipient of a heart transplant is unable to sell his transplant, and is thus unable to see if it
meets the standards of the marketplace.
54. Even when traditional goods are involved, the warranty of merchantability has not been implied where goods could not be compared with other similar goods.
[B]ecause the machines were "semi-experimental" prototypes they had no record of past use on
which to base a determination of their ordinary purpose. There was no showing that the machines were not "such as pass without objection in the trade under the contract description,"
UCC § 2-314(2)(a), for there was no trade in goods of the same kind.
Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664, 670 (1971) (opinion by
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The U.C.C. Approach DiscouragesDevelopment of New Ideas
Imposing a warranty of merchantability upon software producers dis-

courages innovation and development in the software industry. Where a
meaningful standard of merchantability cannot be determined, as in the
case of computer software, courts will tend to allow recovery for any
damages, including economic loss, caused by any defect. 55 The standard
of merchantability will thereby become one of virtual perfection, and
computer software producers will become insurers that their product will
56
perform perfectly.
Justice Braucher, who had formerly been Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS).

See also Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1983);
Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 424 (6th Cir.) (where "no average or
usual standards for determining ordinary performance or quality for the components can be determined. . . . no warranty of merchantability arises from the transaction"), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1099 (1981); Art Press, Ltd. v. Western Printing Mach. Co., No. 82-C-0116 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18,
1983) (order ruling on summary judgment motion) (available on LEXIS).
55. Goods can be merchantable and yet be considerably short of perfection. WHrTE & SUMMERS,
supra note 20, § 9-7, at 353. See also Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1326 (5th
Cir. 1981); Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 30, 76 (1978) (the standard of merchantability "is a relativistic standard defined in large part by
the norms of the marketplace rather than by notions of perfection").
Without the ability to develop an appropriate standard of merchantability, courts will be forced to
choose between being too lenient (no recovery if the software works at all), being too strict (allowing
recovery unless the software works perfectly), or applying an arbitrary and unpredictable standard.
Given this choice, most courts will probably follow the trend, which has culminated in products
liability, of protecting consumers. If that trend is followed, courts will allow recovery for any injury
that resulted from using the software.
56. Products liability theory is based on tort principles: it effectively makes manufacturers insurers of the safety of their products. Warranty theory, on the other hand, is based on contract principles:
it requires sellers to live up to their contractual obligations. Because the two theories have different
underlying bases and are designed to accomplish different purposes, they are not interchangeable.
Before the development of products liability, warranty theory was the only accepted legal theory
that courts could use to make manufacturers insurers of the safety of their products. Although warranty theory was ill-suited to this task, it was all that was available. The development of products
liability, however, freed the warranty of merchantability from the task of protecting consumers from
unreasonably dangerous products. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 149,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel: Strict Liability to the Consumer,
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
There is no longer any need to intermix warranty theory and products liability theory. Because they
are analytically distinct, they should be kept separate. Justice Traynor outlined the analytical differences between the two theories:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff
in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding
of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He
can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to
match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm.
He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless
he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should
not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he
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Imposing such a burden on software producers will unreasonably discourage the development of the software industry. Rather than encouraging experimentation and the development of innovative products, the
enormous potential liability which software producers will face as insurers of the perfection of their products will discourage them from putting
products on the market.
Research and development of new ideas in the computer industry is

vitally important to our nation's economic growth, particularly with the
current intense international competition in high-technology fields. Because computers can be used in almost any field, new applications are
constantly being developed. If software producers developing new applications are forced to act as insurers of the perfection of their product, the
development of new applications will be discouraged. Courts should not
impose a restrictive and economically unworkable standard on software
producers. Instead, they should apply a workable, fair standard in order
57
to encourage innovation and experimentation.
I1. EXISTING THEORIES SHOULD BE APPLIED TO SOFTWARE
TRANSACTIONS
Workable alternatives to the warranty of merchantability exist to compensate injured parties. Rather than distorting the express provisions of
Article 2, courts should apply these existing theories to software transactions.
buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product
will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and
there is no recovery for economic loss alone.
Seely, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Unfortunately, some courts and commentators continue
to intermix warranty theory and products liability theory. See, e.g., Greenfield, ConsumerProtection
in Service Transactions-ImpliedWarranty and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661,
688-96 (assumes that the policies underlying implied warranty theory are the same as those underlying products liability). They are based on distinctly different policies, however, and they should be
kept distinct.
57. The software user's need for some minimum level of protection must also be considered. The
proper standard must strike a balance between protecting the software user by guaranteeing him a
minimally adequate product and protecting the software producer by not requiring her to meet an
improperly high standard. This proper balance can be struck by using the professional negligence
standard. See infra Part ILAI.
Reliance on a theory other than the implied warranty of merchantability will probably lead to
greater protection for software users. Major software producers invariably disclaim the implied warranties. See, e.g., Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1981)
(order ruling on summary judgment and other motions) (available on LEXIS); see also Gemignani,
ProductLiability and Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173, 177 n.16 (1981). By not
requiring software producers to choose between meeting an impossible standard or disclaiming it,
competition to provide more meaningful warranties would be encouraged to develop among these
producers.
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Where defective software causes injury to person or property, 58 relief
may be appropriate under products liability theory. Where economic injury is alleged (and thus products liability theory is inapplicable), claims
under professional negligence theory are appropriate. Moreover, contractual theories such as express warranty, the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, 59 and recovery for breach of an express contract
term can provide the basis for relief in appropriate cases.
A.

Tort Theories

1. ProfessionalNegligence
The professional must "exercise reasonable care and the measure of
skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by members in good standing of
his profession.' 60 The Restatement (Second) of Torts applies this standard to anyone "who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
profession or trade." 6 1 Software and other intangibles are conceptually
similar to services. 62 The standard of conduct required of professionals
and skilled tradespeople who render services should also be required of
software producers. The professional negligence standard-requiring the
use of the knowledge and level of skill typically used in the software industry-would be determined by expert testimony of the software pro64
ducer's peers, 63 just as it is now in the case of doctors and lawyers.
Buyers would be compensated for economic harm only if the producer
failed to meet this minimum professional negligence standard. 65
58. Defective software can injure persons and property. See Comment, Computer Software and
Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439, 440 (1983) (discussing how defective software
is suspected of causing personal injuries in the aeronautical and medical fields).
59. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978).
60. Comment, ProfessionalNegligence.121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 633 (1973).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 299A (1964) (emphasis added).
62. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
63. Involving disinterested computer experts as expert witnesses in the trial process will have an
indirect beneficial effect. Courts often seem to have difficulty dealing with scientific and technological concepts. See generally Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977). Testimony from computer professionals who have no stake in the outcome
of the litigation will undoubtedly help eliminate judicial confusion with fundamental computer concepts.
64. See. e.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that testimony
from expert witnesses is essential in almost all medical malpractice cases).
65. A tort cause of action is usually inappropriate if the only loss is economic. See infra note 75.
However, economic injury can be compensated under the professional negligence standard. See U.S.
Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449. 464 (E.D. Mich. 1972). affd, 509 F.2d
1043 (6th Cir. 1975). Thus, economic injury can be compensated under either a contract or professional negligence theory: personal or property injury can be compensated under either of those theories as well as other tort theories.
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Even though the professional negligence standard seems ideally suited
for application to software producers, the court in Chatlos Systems v. National Cash Register Corp.66 "decline[d] the invitation to create" the
"new tort" of "computer malpractice. "67 The Chatlos court was, however, needlessly and mistakenly concerned that allowing a computer malpractice action would demand "elevated responsibility" of software producers or expose them to "greater potential liability" than would be the
case if the action were disallowed. 68 In fact, the opposite is true, since
negligence must be proved in a malpractice action, while contract liability
is absolute. Thus, greater potential liability will result if the warranty of
merchantability is implied than if the tort of computer malpractice is de69
veloped.
The professional negligence standard requires only a minimum level of
competence, not perfection. 70 Skilled and highly trained people are subject to a higher standard than the lay "reasonable person.' '71 Certainly
66. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), offd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
67. The Chatlos court reasoned that
The novel concept of a new tort called "computer malpractice" is premised upon a theory of
elevated responsibility on the part of those who render computer sales and service. Plaintiff
equates the sale and servicing of computer systems with established theories of professional
malpractice. Simply because an activity is technically complex and important to the business
community does not mean that greater potential liability must attach. In the absence of sound
precedential authority, the Court declines the invitation to create a new tort.
Id. at741 n.l.
The court in Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), also
tacitly seemed to decline to apply the tort of computer malpractice. However, the Triangle court
addressed only the question of whether the "continuous treatment" doctrine-that the statute of limitations begins to run only after the last in a continuous series of treatments-applies to computer
software-hardware producers, and held that it does not. Id. at 744-46. Since the court decided only
that limited question, Triangle does not indicate that computer malpractice is an unacceptable theory.
68. Chatlos,479 F. Supp. at 741 n.l.
69. The seller's responsibility is greater in a contract action than in a negligence action. In the
former, the seller is liable for any breach of express contract terms or of express or implied warranties; the complaining buyer need not prove negligence. See Miller, The ContractualLiability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 413, 417 (noting that the burden on a plaintiff is "immeasurably lighter" in a breach of contract claim than a medical malpractice claim). Thus, the
Chatlos court's approach-applying Article 2 and its warranty provisions-resulted in broader liability than a negligence approach.
70. The professional negligence "average" standard, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
299A (1964), is analogous to the "average" standard of merchantability, see supra note 55. Neither
demands perfection.
71. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1257, 1288 (E.D. La.
1978) (applying the reasonable skill and care of the trade standard to turbine technician), modified,
674 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 448 (1982); U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor &
Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (applying the normal skill and knowledge
of the trade standard to product designer and manufacturer); Chambers v. Western Ariz. CATV, 130
Ariz. 605, 638 P.2d 219, 221 (1981) (applying the normal skill and knowledge of the trade standard
to TV cable installer); City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d 521, 524-25 (1974)
(applying the professional negligence standard to design engineers); Garcia v. Color Tile Distrib.
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software producers are skilled and highly trained. There is no reason why
they cannot be expected to use their skill and knowledge in a "reasonably
72
competent" manner.
Just as the standard of merchantability has developed into a useful standard by which to judge goods, the 'standard of minimum professionally
acceptable conduct' 73 has developed into a useful standard by which to
judge services and analogous intangibles. Thus, the tort of computer malpractice requires only a minimum, reasonable standard analogous to the
"average" standard of merchantability, not an improperly elevated standard.
2.

ProductsLiability

Products liability theory is designed to protect the consumer by requiring the product distributor to pay the cost of injuries and property damage
caused by his defective products. Distributors typically have "deeper
pockets" than the consumer and are better able to prevent dangerous
product defects. 74 But products liability theory has two limitations which
make it unsatisfactory to software users.
First, economic damages usually cannot be recovered under products
liability theory. 75 Because most disgruntled software users have suffered
economic rather than personal or property injury, they are unable to re76
cover under products liability theory.
Co., 75 N.M. 570, 408 P.2d 145, 148 (1965) (applying the skilled tradesperson standard to flooring

installers).
72.

Nivins v. Sievers Hauling Corp., 424 F. Supp. 82, 89 n.7 (D.N.J. 1976) (applying the rea-

sonably competent standard to crane operator).
73. Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 308 (Wyo. 1970) (applying the standard of minimum professionally acceptable conduct to an engineer).
74.

See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Tray-

nor, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1964). These are tort
principles, clearly distinguishable from the contract principles underlying the warranty of merchantability: ensuring that the buyer gets what he agreed to pay for. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (Traynor, J.) (discussing and contrasting the policy
justifications underlying warranty and products liability). Comparing Justice Traynor's opinions in
Escola (1944) and Seely (1965) gives one a sense of how products liability grew more and more

distinct from warranty as it evolved.
75. See generally W.P. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY
920-33 (1980) (majority view is that economic injury cannot be compensated under tort theories).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1964) (limiting products liability to physical

harm to person or property).
76. See, e.g.. APLications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
affd. 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982); Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F.
Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1975).
The principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), limits the liability of
software sellers for consequential damages to those reasonably foreseeable. This limitation on business risk is codified in U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1978). In the typical software case, at least some
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Second, the policies underlying products liability theory do not support
extending liability in the case of custom-made software. 77 Thus, only
plaintiffs who have suffered either personal or property injury due to an
unreasonably dangerous defect in mass-distributed software will be able
to recover under products liability theory.
B.

ContractTheories:Implied Warranty ofFitnessfor a Particular
PurposeandExpress Warranties

The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose has also been
limited historically to transactions in goods. 78 However, courts have indicated a willingness to extend the scope of the implied warranty of fitness
to services, such as architectural designs. 79 The warranty of fitness can
also be usefully applied by analogy to many computer software transactions.
In contrast to the implied warranty of merchantability, which is implied
in almost all sales of goods, the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is implied only in the few cases which meet its unique requireeconomic damages will be reasonably foreseeable, and the Hadley v. Baxendale principle will simply
cut off some claims-those for unforeseeable consequential damages-rather than cut off all liability.
77. The policy justifications underlying products liability theory support liability for mass-produced and mass-distributed software, but not for custom-made software. See Note, Negligence: Liabilityfor Defective Sofnvare, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 848 (1980). See also Halstead v. United States, 535
F. Supp. 782, 789-91 (D. Conn. 1982) (products liability is incurred for mass-produced maps that
contain inaccurate information, but not for defective maps that are custom-made); K-Mart Corp. v.
Midcon Realty Group, Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 813, 816-20 (D. Conn. 1980) (products liability doctrine
applies only to mass-produced architectural designs, not custom-made designs).
Because the policies underlying warranty and products liability theories differ, it would not be
helpful to make a similar distinction between mass-produced and custom-made products in the implied warranty context. Products liability theory is designed to put the burden of injury on the manufacturer in order to spread the risk of injuries and encourage prevention of injuries. This underlying
policy supports products liability for mass-produced products, but not custom-made products. There
is no analogous policy underlying warranty theory. Consequently, there is no policy reason to distinguish between mass-produced and custom-made products in warranty theory. Although there are no
benefits to such an approach, there are costs. To make such a distinction would be to inject "substantive ambiguity into the law of professional malpractice without a favorable trade-off in procedural
expedience." City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420,425 (Minn. 1978).
78. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is contained in U.C.C. § 2-315
(1978), which provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
79. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni Constr. Co., 401 Pa. 358, 164 A.2d 201, 203 (1960) (an
architect impliedly warrants that a structure's design will be reasonably fit for its intended purpose);
see also Department of Transp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 28 Pa. Commw. 214, 368 A.2d 888, 897
(1977) (Article 2 implied warranties held inapplicable to sale of bridge design plans, but a common
law warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is implied).
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ments. 8 0 The warranty requires (1) that the seller know the particular purpose for which the buyer wants the goods, and (2) that the buyer rely on
81
the seller to furnish goods that will accomplish that purpose.
The policy promoted by the warranty justifies courts in extending the
scope of the implied warranty of fitness to software transactions. The policy underlying the warranty of fitness is to prevent conduct bordering on
the deceptive and the fraudulent. By requiring that the seller know the
particular purpose for which the buyer wants the program, the warranty
would not be implied except when the seller knows that the buyer expects
software of a certain quality. Thus, the underlying policy is similar to that
of express warranty, which will be enforced in all transactions. 82 This is
reasonable, because the buyer's reliance on the seller to provide software
that produces certain results closely approximates a similar reliance on an
express statement that it will produce those results.
The Article 2 warranty of fitness applies only to sales. 83 Therefore,
before the warranty is implied in the typical software transaction, which
is not a sale, 84 the circumstances of the transaction should be carefully
examined to see if the warranty can be meaningfully implied. 85 The standards of deception and fraud are similar in all transactions, as opposed to
the standard of merchantability which cannot be determined in software
transactions. Therefore, the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
should be applicable in the majority of software transactions.
In many cases, there will be no need to determine a negligence standard. 86 In addition to the implied warranty of fitness, the express warranties made by the producer and the express terms of the contract must be
80. Unlike the warranty of merchantability, which is "by far the most important warranty in the
Code." WiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 9-5, at 343, the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose has only a "modest place in our jurisprudence" that "has been carefully carved out for it by
the drafters and the case law," id. § 9-10, at 360.
81. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978).
82. Express warranties are enforced in all contracts, including those solely for services. See,
e.g.. Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929); Miller, supra note 69, at 416-23 ("It
seems to be clear law in many jurisdictions that a physician is free to contract as he chooses and will
be held to his promises. ").
83. The warranty of fitness is implied only between a "buyer" and a "seller." See U.C.C. § 2315 (1978).
84. See supra note 39.
85.

See supra note 43.

As discussed supra in Part IIA, Article 2 does not expressly include software within its scope.
However. Article 2 provisions can be applied to computer software contracts by analogy where they
are meaningful and helpful. Although the warranty of merchantability cannot meaningfully be implied, see supra Part 1iB. the warranty of fitness can be. It is basically similar to express warranty
theory, which is similar in both the goods (U.C.C. § 2-313) (1978) and services (e.g.. Hawkins v.
McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929)) areas.
86. See Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 743 n.3 (D.N.J. 1979).
af'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
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honored. Prudent software users will be careful to specify what they expect to receive, and make sure, by requiring compliance with contract
terms, express warranties, and the implied warranty of fitness, that they
get it.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The implied warranty of merchantability has developed into a valuable
tool courts can use to protect consumers. However, the warranty of merchantability should only be implied where the standard of merchantability
has meaning, and it cannot meaningfully be implied in computer software
transactions. Injured parties should look instead to appropriate theories
such as professional malpractice, express warranties, and the implied
warranty of fitness in seeking compensation for harm caused by defective
software.
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